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THE SUPPRESSION SANCTION IN THE FEDERAL
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATUTE
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Title III)1 regulates official use of electronic surveillance for investiga-
tive purposes.2 Title III requires law enforcement officials to satisfy a
series of procedural requirements when applying for3 and executing4 a
surveillance warrant.5 The statute also specifies that a judge must make
certain findings before issuing 6 a warrant and delineates the judge's post-
interception duties.7
Title III contains a suppression sanction for violations of its provi-
sions.8 The Supreme Court has held that not every violation of Title III
1. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)).
2. One of the most significant restrictions on the use of electronic surveillance as an investiga-
tive tool is the requirement that law enforcement officials state in their application for a warrant why
normal investigative procedures have been or would be unsuccessful. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1982);
see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title III,
and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 571 (1975).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982) (detailing mandatory procedures for seeking authorization of
electronic surveillance); id. § 2518(l)(a)-(f) (specifying the required contents of the applications).
4. See id. § 2518(5) (requiring government agents to minimize the interception of nonpertinent
calls); id. § 2518(6) (requiring agents to submit progress reports at the judge's discretion); id.
§ 2518(8)(a)-(b) (requiring sealing of the recordings, applications, and orders of surveillance); id.
* 2518(8)(d) (requiring notice to intercepted persons).
5. Law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant before intercepting communications unless
a party to a communication has consented to the interception. See id. § 2518(1) (outlining the proce-
dures for applying for a warrant); id. § 2518(3)-(6) (outlining the procedures for obtaining judicial
approval of a warrant); id. § 2511(2)(c) (providing that a "person acting under color of law" may
lawfully intercept a conversation where one of the parties to the communication has consented to the
interception); The Supreme Court has held constitutional the consent exception to the Title III war-
rant requirement. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(e)
(1982) (permitting warrantless electronic surveillance by designated United States officials in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Pub. L. No. 95-511 92
Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)).
This Note will not address these exceptions. For a discussion of the various exceptions to the Title
III warrant requirement, see generally J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 63-148
(1977).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982) (specifying the findings a judge must make before issuing a
surveillance warrant); id. § 2518(4) (specifying the content of a surveillance order).
7. See id. § 2518(6) (allowing the issuing judge to order progress reports); id. § 2518(8)(a)-(b)
(requiring the judge to direct the manner of sealing the recordings, applications, and orders); id.
§ 2518(8Xd) (requiring the judge to determine who should receive notice of the interceptions).
8. See id. § 2515 (prohibiting the use of wiretap evidence if disclosure of the evidence would
violate the statute); id. § 2518(10)(a) (describing who may challenge the use of electronic surveil-
lance evidence and delineating the grounds for suppression); infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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requires suppression of the conversations intercepted.' Lower federal
courts have employed several approaches and have reached differing re-
suits in determining whether a specific Title III violation mandates sup-
pression of evidence obtained in contravention of Title III procedural
safeguards.
After examining the background, statutory framework, and proce-
dural requirements of Title III, this Note examines judicial use of sup-
pression to sanction various violations of the statute. 10 This Note
concludes that in deciding whether to suppress intercepted conversa-
tions, courts should adopt the flexible test enunciated in United States v.
Chun1 rather than a test focusing on a "but for" relationship between
the violation of the statute and the interception. 12
I. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PRIOR TO TITLE III
In a series of cases beginning in 1942,13 the Supreme Court upheld the
investigative use of eavesdropping devices in certain circumstances as
permissible under the fourth amendment. 14 In Berger v. New York' 5 and
This Note only addresses application of the suppression sanction at criminal trials. Cf United States
v. Gelbard, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (discussing the applicability of § 2515 to grand jury proceedings);
Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 1, 9-12 (1972) (same).
9. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text (identification requirement); infra notes 100-
16 and accompanying text (notice requirement); infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text (necessity
requirement); infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text (previous applications requirement); infra
notes 150-86 and accompanying text (minimization requirement); infra notes 187-212 and accompa-
nying text (sealing requirement).
11. 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974); see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text; see also notes 79-81 and accompanying text
(discussing "but for" test).
13. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (judicial authorization of taping of a
conversation when it was known that an attorney was attempting to induce a government agent to
bribe jurors); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding admissible recording of conversa-
tions because an agent could testify to their content); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)
(radio transmitter on police agent did not violate the fourth amendment); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942) (use of a detectaphone applied to a wall permissible).
14. The fourth amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Katz v. United States, 6 however, the Court placed general limits on the
use of electronic surveillance by requiring that law enforcement agencies
adhere to minimum procedural requirements. 7
In Berger, 8 the Court held unconstitutional under the fourth amend-
ment' 9 a New York eavesdropping statute that permitted general
searches.2" The Court compared the New York procedures for obtaining
an eavesdropping warrant with those held constitutional in Osborn v.
United States.2 The court observed that the judicial order in Osborn
limited the use of electronic surveillance22 and specified the duties of the
executing officers.23 The Berger Court determined that the New York
eavesdropping statute24 lacked these constitutionally permissible "precise
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. 388 U.S. at 63-64.
18. A justice of the New York Supreme Court, acting pursuant to the New York eavesdropping
statute, see infra note 20, issued an order to install a recording device in an office. The information
gained from the surveillance led to a second eavesdrop order. The second order uncovered a con-
spiracy and implicated the defendant as an intermediary between the principal conspirators. The
district attorney played portions of these recordings at trial, and the jury convicted the defendant of
conspiracy to bribe. All parties stipulated that without the recordings the district attorney did not
have enough information to present a case to the grand jury or to make a successful prosecution.
388 U.S at 54.
19. 388 U.S. at 55-60. The Court held that the New York statute violated the particularity
requirement of the fourth amendment because the statute did not require that a surveillance warrant
specify the site of the surveillance, the conversations to be seized, or the crime under investigation.
Id. at 58. A surveillance warrant under the New York statute did not have to contain a termination
date for the surveillance. Id. at 59-60. In addition, the statute did not include procedures for notice
to affected parties or require return of the warrant to the issuing magistrate. Id. See N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 813a (McKinney 1958).
20. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813a (McKinney 1958). The New York statute did not require
that probable cause support issuance of a surveillance warrant. 388 U.S. at 58. Justice Clark, writ-
ing for the Court, contended that the Court did not need to address whether the statute's "reason-
able ground" standard satisfied the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement, as the statute
was "deficient on its face in other respects." Id. at 55. Justices Harlan and White, in separate
dissenting opinions, objected to the Court's willingness to permit a facial attack on the statute. Id. at
90 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 108-09 (White, J., dissenting). Both dissenting Justices feared that
the Court's holding would significantly restrict future use of electronic surveillance in government
investigations. Id. at 89-90 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting); cf. Note, Eaves-
dropping Under Court Order and the Constitution: Berger v. New York, I Loy. L.A.L. REV. 143,
154 (1968) (maintaining that law enforcement officials may still use electronic surveillance under the
stmngent Berger requirements if they first develop a "substantial, independent case").
21. 388 U.S. at 58 (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)).
22. 388 U.S. at 57. The judicial order in Osborn authorized only a recording of a specific type
of conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. Id.
23. Id. The issuing judge ordered the executing officers to execute the surveillance warrant
promptly and to make a return of the warrant to the judge. Id.
24. 388 U.S. at 58. The Court characterized the New York statute as a "blanket grant of
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and discriminate requirements."25
Six months after Berger, in Katz v. United States,2 6 the Court implicitly
reaffirmed its holding in Berger2 7 and imposed additional procedural re-
quirements.2" In Katz, law enforcement officials failed to obtain a war-
rant authorizing interception of the defendant's conversations. 29 The
Court found the lack of prior judicial authorization enough to invalidate
the surveillance despite the otherwise careful procedures employed to
limit the intrusiveness of the surveillance.3 0
Congress recognized that the limitations imposed by the Court on the
use of electronic surveillance restricted the investigative efforts of law
enforcement officials in controlling organized crime activities.3 Title III
permission" to eavesdrop, lacking both adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures, Id. at
60. See Note, supra note 20 (detailed discussion of Berger).
One commentator suggests that the Berger Court's reference to Osborn creates confusion because
there was no need for judicial authorization in Osborn. Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by
Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296, 312-13 (1968). Professor Dash believes that the Berger Court used
Osborn in its analysis because the latter case presented the unique situation in which law enforce-
ment officials know in advance the type of conversation they wanted to seize and therefore could
describe it with the requisite specificity. Id. at 312-13.
25. 388 U.S. at 58 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 (1966)).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. 389 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1967). The Katz Court quoted the Berger Court's discussion of the
procedures used in Osborn, which "permitted no greater invasion of privacy than was necessary
under the circumstances." Id. (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967)); see Note,
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Title IIIof the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L.
REv. 319, 331 (1969); see also Dash, supra note 24, at 312 (asserting that the Katz Court did not
abandon the Berger requirements).
28. Law enforcement agents in Katz did not commence electronic surveillance until they had
established a strong probability that the defendants were using a public telephone to transmit gam-
bling information. 389 U.S. at 354. The Court approved this procedure, noting that the surveillance
was limited both in scope and duration. Id. The Katz Court ultimately held that an issuing judge
may authorize a surveillance warrant, with appropriate safeguards, if law enforcement officials ade-
quately inform the judge of the need for the investigation and the precise nature of the intrusion. Id.
See infra note 30.
By permitting postsearch notice, the Katz Court also relaxed the Berger requirement of presearch
notice or a statement of exigent circumstances. The Court reasoned that officers need not announce
their search if doing so would cause the destruction of evidence. 389 U.S. at 355 n, 16.
29. Id. at 354-56.
30. Id. at 359. The Court asserted that the fourth amendment requires that government agents
act pursuant to judicially imposed restraints. Id. at 356-57. The Court contended that the judicial
authorization prerequisite ensures neutral judicial review of agents' finding of probable cause. Id. at
356-57.
31. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 119-29 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (excerpting a
report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that dis-
cusses some of the problems facing law enforcement in dealing with organized crime); S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153 [herein-
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of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,32 enacted
one year after the Katz decision, reflected congressional recognition of
law enforcement's need for effective measures against organized crime,
individual rights to privacy,33 and the procedural standards enunciated
in Berger and Katz. 4
II. OVERVIEW OF TITLE III
A. Statutory Framework
Title III requires law enforcement officials and the courts to follow
certain enumerated procedures in securing and issuing a warrant for elec-
tronic surveillance.35 The Attorney General or a specially designated
Assistant Attorney General must authorize an application for a war-
rant.36 The application must carefully describe the crime thought to be
in progress, 37 the place where the interception will occur, 38 and the na-
ture of the conversations to be seized.39 In addition, the application must
name the investigative officer making the request, 40 the authorizing of-
ficer,4 ' and all persons suspected of committing the crime under investi-
gation who will be the subjects of intercepted communications.42 The
applicant must also disclose all previous applications for electronic sur-
after cited as LEGIS. HIsT.]. The Senate Report discusses at length the problem of organized crime,
id. at 2154, 2157-63, and states that the major purpose of Title III is "to combat organized crime."
Id. at 2157.
32 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)).
33 LEGis. HisT., supra note 31, at 2154, 2157-63.
34. Id. at 2161-63. "Working from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance legislation should include the above constitutional standards, the subcommittee has used the
Berger and Katz decisions as a guide in drafting Title III." Id. at 2163.
The Senate Report states that the dual purposes of Title III are "1) to protect the privacy of wire
and oral communications and 2) to delineate on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions
under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." Id. at 2153.
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982) (delineating the procedures for judicial approval of applica-
tions for electronic surveillance); id. § 2518(1)-(3) (establishing the procedures for applying for and
issuing a surveillance order).
36. Id. § 2516(1).
37 Id. § 2518(l)(b)(i),
38. Id. § 2518(l)(b)(ii).
39. Id. § 2518(l)(b)(iii),
40 d. § 2518(l)(a).
41. Id
42 Id § 2518(l)(b)(iv). For a description of the identification requirement, see infra note 86
and accompanying text.
Number 4]
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veillance43 and explain why other investigative techniques have been or
would be unsuccessful.'
The judge initially must determine that probable cause supports issu-
ance of a warrant.45 After finding probable cause, the judge must then
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e) (1982). For a description of the previous applications requirement,
see infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1982). For a description of the necessity requirement, see infra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982) (providing that a judge must find that "there is probable cause
for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter").
The probable cause standard applicable to electronic surveillance cases is apparently identical to
that applied in other search warrant cases. See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 588 F.2d 1030, 1034
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166, 173 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 862 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shakur, 560 F.
Supp. 318, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 476 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 360 (N.D. ILL.), affld, 690 F.2d 1217 (1982);
United States v. Lyons, 507 F. Supp. 551, 554 (D.C. Md. 1981), af'd per curiam, 695 F.2d 802 (4th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (M.D. Pa. 1971). These cases all applied
the two-prong test of probable cause that the Court established in Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In United States '. Clements, for example,
the Fifth Circuit enunciated the probable cause standard in electronic surveillance case as follows:
When the facts that show probable cause are provided by informants, the affidavit must
pass a two-pronged test: first, the judge must be informed of some of the circumstances
relied upon by the informant, and second, facts must be shown from which the affiant
concluded that the informant was reliable so the judge can make an independent determi-
nation of probable cause.
588 F.2d at 1034 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964)).
The Supreme Court recently altered the probable cause standard in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983), rejecting the "two-pronged" Aguillar/Spinelli test in favor of a flexible "totality of the
circumstances" approach. Id. at 2328-32. For a post-Gates determination of probable cause in an
electronic surveillance case, see United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir. 1983) ("fourth
amendment principles are the same in an authorization for a wire tap as in a property search"), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1679 (1984).
When considering attacks on the truthfulness of affidavits, courts generally apply the standard
established in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (providing that only deliberate lies or
a reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant are possible sources for attack).
Franks further provided that a warrant will not be held invalid when alleged false statements do
not detract from the probable cause determination. Id. For cases applying the Franks test to elec-
tronic surveillance warrants, see United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Shakur, 560 F. Supp. 318, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United
States v. Balistrieri, 551 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Wis. 1982); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345,
365-69 (N.D. II.), af'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (1982). The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has held surveillance
warrants invalid upon a finding of either intentional or reckless misrepresentation, regardless of the
materiality of the misrepresentation or the innocence of a misstatement of a material fact. See
United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 865 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664,
669 (5th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 856-69 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing
the difference between the Franks test and the Fifth Circuit test).
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issue an order stating the facts that justify the interception,4 6 a statement
of when the interception should cease,47 and an instruction that execu-
tion of the surveillance warrant must minimize the interception of con-
versations not included in the order.48  Title III also articulates
procedures for providing notice to affected parties49 and for sealing the
tapes after interception. °
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of Title
MI."l The Court has, however, interpreted various subsections of the
statute.5 2 Lower federal courts that have addressed the constitutionality
of Title III have uniformly sustained its validity. 3
B. The Suppression Sanction
In the event that law enforcement officials or the issuing judge violates
the requirements of Title III in the course of intercepting a conversation,
the statute imposes the strict sanction of suppression. 4 Supreme Court
interpretations of the suppression remedies of Title III, however, indicate
that not all violations of the statute will result in suppression. 55
46 See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
47, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e) (1982).
48 Id. § 2518(5). For a description of the minimization requirement, see infra notes 150-59
and accompanying text.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982) (providing for mandatory notice to persons named in the
surveillance order and notice to other persons at the discretion of the issuing judge). For a descrip-
tion of the notice requirement, see infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1982) (requiring sealing of recordings immediately after execution
of the order at the direction of the issuing judge). For a discussion of the sealing requirement, see
infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
51. See J. CARR, supra note 5, at 33.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) (interpreting the identification and
notice requirements); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) (interpreting the authorization
requirements of§ 2516(1)); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (same). For a discussion
of these cases, see infra notes 56-70 & 87-116 and accompanying text.
53. See United States v. Smith, 712 F.2d 702, 707 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983) (collecting cases).
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)(i)-(iii) (1982). Section 2515 provides that evidence from
electronic surveillance may not be used at trial in violation of Title III. Section 2518(10)(a)(i)-(iii)
states that any "aggrieved person" may move to suppress evidence of electronic surveillance if
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conform-
ity with the order of authorization or approval." Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i)-(iii).
55. See United States v. Chavez, 416 US. 562, 572-73 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416
U.S. 505, 528 (1974); cf J. CARR, supra note 5, at 354-55 (determining the availability of suppression
by analyzing Chavez and Giordano); C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 252
(1978) (Chavez and Giordano define the scope of § 2518(10)(a)(i)).
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In United States v. Giordano,16 the Supreme Court determined that
authorization of an application for a surveillance warrant by the Execu-
tive Assistant to the Attorney General violated section 2516(1), which
requires that the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant
Attorney General authorize an interception order.57 The Court then
considered whether this violation necessitated suppression of evidence
obtained from the illegal wiretap."8 The Court examined the legislative
history of Title III to determine the purpose of section 2516(l) 59 and
concluded that the authorization procedures occupied a central role in
the statutory scheme.6' Thus, in the Court's view, the violation war-
ranted suppression of the intercepted communication.6'
56. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
57. Id. at 510-11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982).
58. 416 U.S. at 525.
59. Id. at 516-23. The Court determined that § 2516(1) ensures that government officials will
not use electronic surveillance as in investigatory technique unless a senior officer in the Department
of Justice decides that the situation warrants such an intrusion on personal privacy, Id. at 528.
The Senate Report accompanying Title III provides additional purposes of § 2516(1):
This provision centralizes in a publicly responsible official, subject to the political process
the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance techniques.
Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices might develop. Should
abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision in
itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will happen.
LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 31, at 2185.
60. 416 U.S. at 528-29.
61. Id. The Giordano Court also held that § 2515, which requires suppression of "evidence
derived" from an unlawful interception, and § 2518(10)(a), which permits an "aggrieved person" to
move to suppress "evidence derived" from an unlawful interception, mandated the suppression of
evidence from an extension order.
In construing the two suppression sections of Title III, the Supreme Court ignored § 2515 in favor
of § 2518(10)(a). Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title IM: Another Dissent to
Giordano and Chavez. 123 U. PA. L. REv. 750, 782, 788 (1975). The practical effect of Giordano
was to narrow the scope of § 2515 to the specific grounds of suppression listed in § 2518(10)(a)(i)-
(iii). Pulaski, supra, at 782.
The Giordano Court, in interpreting § 2518(10)(a), rejected the government's argument that
§ 2518(10)(a)(i) ("the communication was unlawfully intercepted") only reaches constitutional vio-
lations. 416 U.S. at 525. The Court held that § 2518(10)(a)(i) covers both constitutional and statu-
tory violations. Id. at 527. The Court also held that § 2518(10)(a)(ii) ("the order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face") and § 2518(10)(a)(iii) ("the inter-
ception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval") relate only to
statutory violations. Id. at 526. Professor Pulaski, in contrast, finds this dichotomy between the
various subsections artificial. Pulaski, supra, at 788.
The Court in Giordano stated explicitly that the suppression decision did not depend on the appli-
cation of the "judicially fashioned" exclusionary rule, but upon the provisions of Title III. 416 U.S.
at 524.
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The Court in United States v. Chavez 62 considered a different violation
of Title III and reached a contrary conclusion. In Chavez, the Court
considered the applicability of the suppression sanction to violations of
sections 2518(l)(a) 63 and 2518(4)(d), 6 which require both the applica-
tion for the warrant and the order authorizing the interception to contain
the name of the authorizing officer.6 5
Justice White, writing for the Court, asserted that Congress did not
intend these sections to serve a "substantive role" in Title 111.66 Rather,
Congress included these sections merely to ensure compliance with the
authorization procedures of section 251667 and to facilitate the "fixing of
responsibility" for the approval of the application.68 Justice White ac-
cordingly found suppression inappropriate,69 concluding that these pur-
poses had been served despite the violations.7 °
C. Principal Tests for Suppression: Chun and "But For"
Applying the standards announced by the Supreme Court in Giordano
and Chavez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Chun,7 1 formulated a three-part test for determining which violations of
Title III require suppression.72 Under Chun, the first inquiry is whether
62 416 U.S, 562 (1974).
63, 18 US.C. § 2518(l)(a) (1982).
64. Id. § 2518(4)(d).
65. 416 U.S. at 568. In Chavez, the Attorney General reviewed and authorized an application
for electronic surveillance; however, the Assistant Attorney General signed his name to the applica-
tion and order. Id. at 566.
66. Id. at 578.
67, Id. at 575; see also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (reviewing the Giordano
Court's discussion of § 2516).
68. 416 U.S. at 575. See supra note 59 (quoting the Senate Report's determination of the need
to place responsibility for applications on a particular person). The Court found nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that Congress intended sections 2518(l)(a) and 2518(4)(d) to play a
central role in the statutory scheme. 416 U.S. at 579; see also LEGIs. HIST., supra note 31, at 2189,
2191.
69 416 U.S. at 579-80. The Court added a cautionary note to its conclusion, asserting "we also
deem it appropriate to suggest that strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of Title III
would nonetheless be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when
authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is sought." Id. at 580.
70 Id. at 578. The Court held that the purpose of sections 2518(l)(a) and 2518(4)(d) was to
-simplify the assurance that those whom Title III makes responsible for determining when and how
wiretapping and electronic surveillance should be conducted have fulfilled their roles in each case
416 U.S. at 577.
71, 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974).
72, The Chun court initially addressed the question whether the alleged Title III violation re-
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the violation relates to a "central or functional safeguard" of Title III.7"
If so, the reviewing court should then determine whether the purpose of
the safeguard was satisfied, despite the violation.74 The Ninth Circuit
held that a reviewing court should suppress illegally intercepted commu-
nications Whenever government officials violate a central safeguard of the
statute and fail to satisfy the purpose of the safeguard.75 Third, the Chun
court suggested that courts should suppress intercepted conversations
whenever government officials deliberately ignore statutory requirements
to their tactical advantage.76
The Supreme Court adopted a different approach to the suppression
question in United States v. Donovan,77 decided three years after Chun.78
In Donovan, the Court employed a "but for" analysis, focusing on the
"substantive role" of the violated procedure in the judicial authorization
of electronic surveillance.79 If "but for" the violation the judge would
not have issued the surveillance warrant, the reviewing court should sup-
press the intercepted conversations. s° If, however, the judge would have
issued the warrant even if government officials had fully complied with
the statute, suppression is inappropriatea
quired suppression under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Id. at 536. Finding no constitu-
tional violation, the court applied the three-part test. Id. at 538.
73. Id. at 542 (citing United States v. Chavez, 416 US. 562, 578 (1974); United States v. Gior-
dano, 516 U.S. 505, 516 (1974)).
74. Id. (citing United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1974); United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 524-28 (1974)).
75. Id.
76. Id. The Chun court based the third part of its test on "an implicit suggestion" in United
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) without citing a specific section of the Chavez opinion. In
Chavez, however, the Court responded to allegations that the violation of § 2518(l)(a) and
§ 2518(4)(d) was deliberate and designed to mislead the issuing court, 416 U.S. at 573, by stating
that no purpose would be served by misleading the court when the Attorney General himself ap-
proved the application. The Court's statement could be read to suggest that suppression may be
appropriate if the government deliberately misleads the court to secure an advantage.
77. 429 U.S. 413 (1977). Donovan is the only Supreme Court decision since Giordano and
Chavez to address the applicability of Title III's suppression remedies to Title III violations. See
infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text (discussing Donovan).
78. The Supreme Court cited the Chun analysis in deciding whether government officials vio-
lated the notice requirement. 429 U.S. at 431 & n.21. The Court did not, however, apply or discuss
the Chun test in its consideration of the suppression sanction.
79. Id. at 435. "The issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those
likely to be heard in incriminating conversations plays a 'substantive role' with respect to judicial
authorization of intercept orders .. Id. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
80. 429 U.S. at 435-36.
81. Id. The Donovan Court did not explicitly use the "but for" language in formulating its
approach to the suppression question. Lower federal courts have characterized the Donovan ap-
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Application of the Donovan "but for" test is generally limited to
preauthorization violations and errors in the issuance of the warrant be-
cause the inquiry is whether the violation would have affected the deci-
sion to issue the surveillance warrant.8 2 The Donovan Court did not
decide whether the suppression sanction applies to deliberate violations
of the statute. 3 The Chun test, on the other hand, is broader in scope
and applies by its terms to all Title III violations.84
III. THE SUPPRESSION SANCTION'S APPLICABILITY TO TITLE III
PROVISIONS
Giordano, Chavez, Donovan, and Chun have provided subsequent
courts with substantive guidance in deciding which Title III violations
require suppression." The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
proach as a "but for" test and have utilized the test in resolving the suppression question in different
contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 565 F. Supp. 353, 366, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In Wil-
hams, FBI agents obtained a warrant without revealing to the issuing judge how they intended to
enter the site of the requested surveillance. The court held that Title III did not require suppression
because the judge would have issued the warrant even if there had been full disclosure. In United
States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afl'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (1982), the same court
stated that suppression of only those items the government would not have been able to seize had
there been no violation was appropriate. Id. at 377 n.30; see also United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d
1395 (8th Cir. 1976). In Civella, the Eighth Circuit decided that suppression was inappropriate
when an application for surveillance warrant falsely stated that an affidavit was attached. The court
reasoned that the failure of the issuing judge to read the affidavit did not influence his decision to
issue the warrant; therefore, the omission was irrelevant for suppression purposes. Id. at 1401.
82. 429 U.S. at 435; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83. The Donovan Court suggested that an intentional violation would present a "different case."
429 U.S. at 436 n.23; see infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing intentional violations of
the identification requirement). If the Supreme Court were to decide that a deliberate Title III
violation is grounds for suppression, then the "but for" test could apply to both pre and post-
authorization violations.
84. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. The "but for" test is distinguishable from
the three-part Chun test in that the threshold inquiry in Chun is whether the requirement serves a
central function in the statutory scheme as a whole. The "but for" test focuses on whether the
violation would affect the judicial authorization of the warrant. The two tests are similar in other
respects. Chun's second inquiry as to whether government officials satisfied the purpose of the re-
quirement, despite their violation, is analogous to the question under the "but for" test whether the
judge would have issued the surveillance warrant if the government had fully complied with the
statute. The third Chun inquiry, whether the government deliberately violated the procedure to its
tactical advantage, is similar to the question that the Donovan Court specifically reserved for future
resolution. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 584 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (characterizing process as picking and choosing); see also Pulaski, supra note 61,
at 789 (same).
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considered the applicability of the suppression sanction to various Title
III provisions and have reached inconsistent results.
A. The Identification Requirement
Title III requires that the officers applying for a warrant name all per-
sons who will be the subjects of intercepted communications. 6  In
United States v. Donovan,87 the Supreme Court decided that a violation
of the identification requirement does not mandate suppression."
In Donovan, government officials applying for a surveillance warrant
failed to name three persons whom they had probable cause to believe
were committing gambling-related offenses and whose conversations they
expected to intercept.8 9 The Court employed the "but for" test 9° and
concluded that even if the government had satisfied the identification re-
quirement, the judge would have issued the surveillance warrant. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Court refused to suppress the intercepted conversations. 92
The Donovan Court did not directly address the question whether sup-
pression is appropriate when a defendant demonstrates that the govern-
ment deliberately withheld information from the issuing judge. 93  In
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1982). "Each application shall include the following informa-
tion . . . (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communica-
tions are to be intercepted." Id. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1974)
(government need not name in an application for a surveillance warrant those persons whose exist-
ence is known but whom the government does not believe are committing a crime).
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977), that § 2518(b)(iv)
requires that the government name in its application all persons whom it has probable cause to
believe are committing the offense under investigation and whose conversations it expects to inter-
cept. Id. at 429.
87. 429 U.S. 413 (1977); see supra note 77.
88. 429 U.S. at 440; see also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 178 (summarizing and criticizing
Donovan).
89. 429 U.S. at 419-20.
90. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
91. 429 U.S. at 435.
92. Id. at 435-36. But see J. CARR, supra note 5, at 178 (stating that the Donovan Court's
presumption that the judge would have issued the warrant if the applying officers had satisfied the
identification requirement is irrelevant and "misapplies" United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974)).
Other statutory factors justifying the issuance of a surveillance warrant, according to Justice Pow-
ell, include the existence of probable cause, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b), (d) (1982), and the failure of
normal investigative techniques, id. § 2518(3)(c). For a discussion of the probable cause standard in
electronic surveillance cases, see supra note 45. For a discussion of the necessity requirement, see
infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
93. The Court suggested that a showing that the government deliberately violated the identifi-
cation requirement would present a "different case." 429 U.S. at 436 n.23; see also J. CARR, supra
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addition, one court has added the possibility of prejudice to the defend-
ant as grounds for suppression whenever the warrant application does
not name the defendant.94
Suppression as a sanction for unintentional violations of the identifica-
tion requirement is similarly inappropriate under the Chun test.95 The
Court in both Chavez and Donovan observed that the identification re-
quirement is not "central" to Title III's statutory framework.96 The
note 5, at 178 (Donovan suggests that intentional failure to name an individual in the application for
electronic surveillance might lead to suppression); supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing
the "but for" test and intentional violations of Title III).
For cases decided since Donovan that have considered deliberate violations of the identification
requirement, see United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 886 (9th Cir.) (suppression for an identifica-
tion requirement violation requires an allegation of intentional omission), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962
(1979); United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1978) (Donovan does not require
suppression in the absence of a suggestion of improper government motive); United States v. Cox,
567 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1977) (contention that Donovan requires suppression because of a violation
of the identification requirement is without merit), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1978); United States v.
Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1977) (Donovan does not foreclose bad faith on the govern-
ment's part as a grounds for suppression), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); United States v. Jack-
son, 549 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.) (Title III does not require suppression in the absence of any suggestion
that the government deliberately failed to name defendants in an attempt to keep information from
the court), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
94. See United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1978). The court stated that
the failure to name the defendant in the application did not warrant suppression because the omis-
sion did not prejudice the defendant in any way. See also United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 13,
439 n.26 (1977) (reserving "prejudice" as grounds for suppression in the event of a violation of the
postinterception notice requirement); infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing the no-
tice requirement). The Rotchford court did not reveal what would constitute prejudice to the de-
fendant in an identification requirement violation. In finding that there was no prejudice, however,
the court noted that the unnamed defendant received postinterception notice. 575 F.2d at 174; see
also United States v. Costanza, 549 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1977) (failure to state the defendants'
names in an order not prejudicial because the defendants received notice within the statutory time).
But see United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (contending that the
Supreme Court in Donovan foreclosed prejudice as a ground for suppression where the government
violates the identification requirement), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
95. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing Chun test). The Chun court itself
found the notice provisions central to the statute's protection. 503 F.2d at 542. The statute only
mandates notice to those named in the warrant. Id.; infra note 101 and accompanying text. Thus,
the Chun court might have suppressed wiretap evidence because of a violation of the identification
requirement if the persons omitted from the warrant did not receive discretionary notice. In Dono-
van, the persons omitted from the warrant received discretionary notice. 429 U.S. at 436 n.23. The
Donovan Court's holding that a violation of the notice requirement does not compel suppression thus
negates the Chun court's conclusions as to the centrality of the notice provision and its probable
conclusion as to the centrality of the identification requirement.
96. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 434-37 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 562, 578 (1974). Although the Donovan Court did not use the Chun test, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, began his consideration of the applicability of the suppression sanction to a
violation of the identification requirement by determining that the requirement does not play a "cen-
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Donovan Court also examined the legislative history of Title III and con-
cluded that Congress intended the identification provision to satisfy the
"constitutional command of particularization. '9 7 The Court found that
the government satisfied this requirement even though it omitted the
names of three persons from the application.98 The Chun test does, how-
ever, warrant suppression whenever government officials intentionally vi-
olate the identification requirement to their advantage. 99
B. The Notice Requirement
The Donovan Court also decided whether a violation of the notice re-
quirement of Title III requires suppression. 1" Section 2518(8)(d) re-
quires mandatory notice to persons named in the application and, at the
issuing judge's discretion, notice to others overheard. 10 In Donovan, the
government inadvertently omitted two names from a list it gave the judge
of persons overheard in an interception. 102 The Court determined that
this omission violated section 2518(8)(d) °3 but held that the violation
tral. . . role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance." United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 437 (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 578).
97. 429 U.S. at 437. The Donovan Court observed that the legislative history of Title III does
not reveal a "central" or "functional" purpose to the identification requirement:
The only explanation given in the Senate Report for the inclusion of the broad identifica-
tion provision was that it was intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the consti-
tutional command of particularization. . . . No additional guidance can be gleaned from
the floor debates, since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification
provision.
Id.
98. Id. at 435-37.
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. 429 U.S. at 417.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982) provides as follows:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after the filing of an application for
an order of approval . . . the issuing. . . judge shall cause to be served, on the person
named in the order of the application, and such other parties to intercepted communica-
tions as the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an
inventory which shall include notice of-
(1) the fact of the entry of the order or application;
(2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disapproved intercep-
tion, or the denial of the application; and
(3) the fact that during the period wire or oral communications were or were not
intercepted.
102. 429 U.S. at 420-21.
103. Id. at 433. Justice Powell maintained that the government may fulfill its duties under
§ 2518(8)(d) in two ways. He noted that the government may provide the court with a general
description of the classes of persons who were the subject of electronic surveillance. Id. at 430-31
(citing United States v. Chun, 503 F. 2d 533, 540 (9th Cir. 1974)). Under such an approach, a court
can exercise its discretion as to which classes of interceptees should receive notice. The second way,
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did not require suppression. t°4
The Court examined the legislative history of Title III to determine the
purpose of the notice provisions." 5 The Court determined that Congress
intended the notice requirement merely to promote responsible use of
electronic surveillance10 6 and not to operate as an independent restraint
on the wiretap procedure.'07 Observing that Congress did not manifest
any intention to regard conversations intercepted without postintercep-
tion notice as unlawful,"0 8 the Court concluded that a violation of the
notice requirement does not mandate suppression.' 0 9
The Donovan Court left open the possibility of suppression for inten-
tional violations of the notice requirement. 10 In addition, the Court's
consideration of prejudice to the defendant" 1 has led lower courts to
conclude that prejudice to the defendant may be grounds for suppressing
which the government chose to pursue in Donovan, is to provide the court with a list of individual
interceptees. 429 U.S. at 432. Because the government must supply the court with a complete list if
it chooses the latter method, the omission of two names in Donovan violated § 2518(8)(d). Id. at
433.
104. 429 U.S. at 435, 440-41.
105. Id. at 439.40.
106. Id. at 438-39. The Senate Report accompanying Title III assumes that the notice require-
ment will ensure reasonable surveillance techniques:
The intent of the provision is that the principle use of postuse notice will be retained. This
provision alone should insure the community that the techniques are reasonably employed.
Through its operation all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress for example, section 2520 if he
feels that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded.
LEGis. HisT., supra note 31, at 2194. But see J. CARR, supra note 5, at 286 (contending that post-
interception notice does not ensure reasonable surveillance techniques because statutory notice is
private, rather than public, and need not be given to those persons not named in the warrant).
Professor Carr asserts that the discretionary aspect of the notice requirement will increase the fear of
secret, undisclosed electronic surveillance. Id.
107. 429 U.S. at 440.
108. Id. at 439.
109. Id. at 440.
110. 429 U.S. at 439 n.26. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that Donovan leaves
open the possibility of suppression for intentional violations of the identification requirement); see
also United States v. DiGirlomo, 550 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1977) (remanding the case to determine if
the government's omission was intentional).
One court has held that suppression for intentional violations of the identification appropriate only
upon a showing of bad faith omissions by the government. United States v. Barletta, 565 F.2d 985,
990-91 (8th Cir. 1977). In Barletta government agents mistakenly withheld names from a notice list.
The court refused to suppress the evidence from the wiretap because the defendants did not allege
bed faith on the government's part.
111. The Court observed that the notice requirement violation did not prejudice the defendants.
429 U.S. at 439 n.6.
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wiretap evidence gathered in contravention of this requirement.1 1 2
The Donovan Court's "but for" test1 13 focuses on the judicial authori-
zation of the wiretap and thus does not apply to postauthorization viola-
tions of the notice requirement.11 4 The Court's approach in Donovan
resembles the Chun analysis1 ' in its examination of the role of the notice
requirement in the overall structure of Title III. Because the Court
found that the notice requirement does not serve a central function,' 16 it
did not have to decide whether the violation obstructed the statutory
purpose.
C. The Necessity Requirement
Title III requires an affidavit supporting a wiretap application to state
112. See, e.g., United States v. DiGirlomo, 550 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1977) (remanding for a consid-
eration of prejudice to the defendants for lack of notice).
Courts have been reluctant to suppress on the grounds of prejudice to the defendant, even when a
substantial period of time has lapsed between the time of interception and the time of pretrial notice.
See United States v. Barletta, 565 F.2d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 1977) (time delay in giving notice was not
prejudicial to defendants because the wiretap evidence was not subject to the problems of human
memory); United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879, 885 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977) (Donovan forecloses the
claim that prejudice in the form of staleness can be grounds for suppression); United States v. Law-
son, 545 F.2d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 1975) (two-year delay between interception and notice did not
require suppression because defendants received notice three months before trial); United States v.
Lamonge, 485 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1972) (failure of defendant to receive notice until one day before
trial did not require suppression); United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp. 1309, 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(six-month delay was not prejudicial despite defendants' claims that they were unable to reconstruct
their conversations); United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (w.D. Pa. 1971) (suppression was
inappropriate where the defendants eventually received notice and did not allege prejudice). But see
United States v. DiGirlomo, 550 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1977) (although the defendants had pretrial
access to the recordings, the court remanded for a determination of prejudice).
In United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's contentions that he did not know that he was the target of a grand jury investigation and that
he was not aware of the incriminating nature of his statements because he did not receive notice.
The court reasoned that the defendant should have realized the incriminating nature of statements
made at a grand jury proceeding and rejected his contention that failure to recieve timely notice of
wiretapping resulted in prejudice. Id. at 885.
113. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
114. The Supreme Court may, however, expand the scope of the "but for" test to cover deliber-
ate violations of Title III procedures. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
116. This finding is implicit in the Court's statement that Congress did not intend the notice
requirement to serve as an independent restraint on the use of electronic surveillance. 429 U.S. at
438-39; see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. The Donovan Court contended that it did
not "think that the failure to comply fully with [the notice requirement] renders unlawful an inter-
cept order .. " 429 U.S. at 434. The Chun court came to a different conclusion as to the central-
ity of the notice provision. 503 F.2d at 542. See supra note 95.
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why other investigative techniques have not been or would not be suc-
cessful.'1 7 The wiretap order must also state that normal investigative
procedures are inadequate to meet the situation. 1'8 These two provisions
are collectively known as the necessity requirement.' 19
Courts have been reluctant to find a violation of this requirement. 120
In the event that the defense proves a violation, the Second and Ninth
Circuits require suppression of all wiretapping evidence. 12 ' These cir-
117. 18 US.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1982).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1982).
119. See Note, supra note 2, at 572.
Courts have held that the necessity requirement requires an applying officer to assert more than
that, merely from experience, the nature of the crime under investigation requires electronic surveil-
lance. See, e.g., United States v. Gerardi, 586 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1978) (conclusory statement that
normal investigative techniques are usually unsuccessful in dealing with government operations is
insufficient to satisfy necessity requirement); United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578, 588 (D.C.
Cir.) (general statements that other investigatory procedures have been unsuccessful does not satisfy
requirement), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978). The legislative history of Title III indicates that the
necessity requirement should be read in a commonsense fashion and should not preclude electronic
surveillance until law enforcement officials have tried every imaginable investigatory technique. See
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 31, at 2190. "Merely because a normal investigative technique is theoreti-
cally possible, it does not follow that it is unlikely. What the provision envisions is that the showing
be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion .... " Id.
120. United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir.) (holding that the government satisfied
the necessity requirement even though it should have included more information), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1975); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding the necessity
requirement met although the government should have admitted that a traditional search would
have been useful), affid without opinion, 553 F.2d (2d Cir. 1977).
The government's burden in proving compliance with the necessity requirement is "not great."
United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp.
285, 299 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
121. See United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d
1317 (9th Cir. 1979). In Lilla, an undercover police officer investigating a drug conspiracy employed
electronic surveillance techniques in place of other available methods of investigation that had been
successful in the past. The Second Circuit held that the use of electronic surveillance was unwar-
ranted, notwithstanding the government's contentions that the conspiracy was large and that the
conspirators often used telephones. 699 F.2d at 104-05. After finding a violation of the necessity
requirement, the court suppressed the wiretap evidence without discussion. Id. at 100, 105. In
Santora, the Ninth Circuit held that the inadequacy of normal investigative techniques with respect
to one conspirator did not automatically operate to the benefit of all other conspirators. The court
found a violation of the necessity requirement, however, and automatically suppressed all surveil-
lance evidence. 600 F.2d at 1320; see also United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1977) (because Congress clearly intended § 2518(l)(c) to limit the use of wiretaps, the remedy of
§ 2515 applies to violations of the necessity requirement); United States v. Adams, 536 F.2d 303, 303
(9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (finding that the factual situation was indistinguishable from that in
United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975), and reversing a district court decision not
to suppress the evidence); United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding a
violation of the necessity requirement and suppressing the evidence without discussing why suppres-
sion was appropriate).
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cuits have indicated 122 that the necessity requirement is an important
precondition to the use of electronic surveillance1 23 and is, therefore, an
important safeguard of privacy.' 24
Courts have not explicitly used the Chun test 25 in determining
whether a violation of the necessity requirement mandates suppression of
evidence of electronic surveillance. Application of this test, however,
probably would result in suppression. Courts have determined that the
necessity requirement is a central safeguard of Title III,26 satisfying the
first Chun inquiry. The second Chun inquiry, requiring a determination
of the purpose of the requirement, would also militate toward suppres-
sion. The purpose of the necessity requirement is two-fold: to ensure
that law enforcement officers do not employ electronic surveillance as
their first investigatory tactic and to ensure that the issuing judge agrees
with law enforcement's assessment of the need for electronic surveil-
lance.' 27 If facts supporting the wiretap are not presented to the issuing
judge, the purpose of the necessity requirement is not fulfilled and the
second prong of the Chun test is not satisfied. 128
A "but for" test'29 rarely applies in this context because a finding that
a violation of the necessity requirement has occurred assumes that the
122. See cases cited supra note 121. These courts devoted most of their analysis to determining
whether there had been a violation of the neccesity requirement and not to whether suppression was
appropriate once a violation had been established.
123. See United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S. 143 (1974)) (asserting that the necessity requirement ensures that law enforcement officers
do not employ electronic surveillance as their first investigative technique); United States v. Spagnu-
olo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (contending that Congress clearly intended the necessity
requirement to limit the use of wiretaps); see also United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 590 (9th
Cir. 1976) (suggesting that a reviewing court must make sure that the issuing judge has carefully
scrutinized the necessity for electronic surveillance).
124. United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that the necessity
requirement serves the congressional purpose of protecting privacy).
125. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
127. See, eg., United States v. Messersmith, 692 F.2d 1315 (1lth Cir. 1982); United States v.
Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
LEGIs. HisT., supra note 31, at 2190.
128. The third Chun inquiry, whether the government deliberately violated the necessity require-
ment to its tactical advantage, is inapplicable because the government does not directly control
whether or not a violation occurs. Government officials may intentionally misstate their reasons for
believing that electronic surveillance is necessary; however, the judicial determination of necessity is
the focus of this requirement, not the actions of applying officers. See infra text accompanying note
129.
129. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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judge's assessment of the need for electronic surveillance was incorrect.
Reviewing courts usually apply this test in situations in which law en-
forcement officers did not reveal facts that, if revealed, may have influ-
enced the judge's decision to issue the warrant. 130 Courts may be able to
apply the "but for" test if unstated facts exist that would support a find-
ing of necessity. In applying the "but for" test, a reviewing court could
find that if the application for a surveillance warrant had included these
facts, the issuing judge properly would have discerned a need for elec-
tronic surveillance and would have issued the warrant.
D. Previous Applications
Title III requires applying officers to disclose all previous applications
for electronic surveillance to the issuing judge.' Courts have inter-
preted this requirement to mean that the applicant need only reveal to
the judge all previous applications directed against persons named in the
present application.' 32 In addition, courts have distinguished between
previous applications and previous interceptions, concluding that only
the former require disclosure.1 33
In the leading case of United States v. Bellosi,134 the District of Colum-
bia Circuit found that the previous applications requirement serves a cen-
tral function in Title III by restricting use of electronic surveillance by
law enforcement officials.' 35 The court's examination of the requirement
130. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) (government omitted two names
from a list of persons who were subject to electronic surveillance); United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d
833 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (government failed to reveal prior applications).
131 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e) (1982).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
US. 1009 (1978).
133. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 945 (1977); see also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 187 (discussing purpose of requirement).
The previous applications requirement does not require the government to disclose the details of
prior applications. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afj'd, 690 F.2d
1217 (7th Cir. 1982).
134. 501 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
135. Id. at 841. The court stated that an issuing judge requires information concerning prior
applications to protect the public from overzealous law enforcement officials. Id. See also J. CARR,
supra note 5, at 187 (disclosure of prior applications permits issuing judge to assess information in
the application).
In Bellosi, the court found that the applying officers deliberately chose not to reveal a previous
application to the judge. Id. at 835. The officers feared that an earlier wiretapping may have been
illegal and did not want to establish any connection between the previous interception and the re-
quested surveillance. Id.
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revealed several purposes. First, the previous applications requirement
precludes the government from "judge shopping."' 36 In addition, com-
pliance with the requirement permits the issuing judge to consider both
the effect of another intrusion on the suspect's privacy and the actions of
other judges in approving or denying previous applications. 37 The court
also asserted that judicial scrutiny of prior applications ensures that evi-
dence from previous illegal wiretaps will have no bearing on the present
wiretap. 138 The court accordingly suppressed the information derived
from the illegal wiretaps.'
39
Some courts have limited the Bellosi holding to situations in which the
government intentionally omits disclosure of previous applications. 4
For example, one court held that a page missing from an affidavit re-
vealing previous applications was not grounds for suppression.' 4 1
Although it did not explicitly utilize the three-part Chun test,' 42 the
Bellosi court, after finding that the previous applications requirement is
essential to Title III, explored whether the government's violation ob-
structed the purposes of the requirement. 43 The court initially stated
that selective government disclosure of prior applications would increase
the likelihood of judicial authorization of electronic surveillance.t44 The
court also emphasized that the government officials in Bellosi acted egre-
giously in deliberately choosing not to reveal a previous application that
they believed might be illegal.145 Therefore, suppression of the inter-
cepted conversations in Bellosi satisfied the purposes of the previous ap-
plications requirement.
The analysis in Bellosi also suggests application of the "but for" test.1
46
136. Id. The government argued that avoiding this practice was the principle purpose behind the
previous applications requirement. Id.
137. Id. at 838.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 835. But see United States v. Martorella, 455 F. Supp. 459, 462 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(suggesting that suppression would have been inappropriate if the court had found a violation of the
requirement).
140. United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1977) (the court found no evidence
of a deliberate government attempt to hide pertinent information), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978); United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (distinguishing United States v.
Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1974), as involving an intentional omission).
141. United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
142. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
143. 501 F.2d at 841.
144. Id. at 840-41.
145. Id. at 840; see supra note 135.
146. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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The court noted that the issuing judge might have been reluctant to issue
an interception order if he had known of the undisclosed previous appli-
cation. 147 Some courts have failed to examine the underlying purposes of
the disclosure requirement and have in fact applied a narrow "but for"
test.'48 After finding a violation of the prior applications requirement,
these courts have examined the application to determine whether the
omission may have affected the judge's finding of necessity and probable
cause. 1
49
E. The Minimization Requirement
Title III requires the government to execute every surveillance order
so as to minimize the interception of nonpertinent communications. 50
Neither the statute nor the legislative history provides any guidance to
reviewing courts in defining a violation of this requirement.'
In United States v. Scott, 5 2 the Supreme Court held that in determin-
ing compliance with the minimization requirement, courts must assess
the objective reasonableness of agents' actions'5 3 rather than their subjec-
147. 501 F.2d at 840-41; cf United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 582 (1979) (no tactical ad-
vantage in the government's representation that an Assistant Attorney General authorized an appli-
cation that in fact had been authorized by the Attorney General).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Abrahmson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977); United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Abrahmson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977). In Abrahmson, the government disclosed a previous application but failed to inform the
issuing judge that a reviewing court had suppressed evidence from the previous surveillance. The
Eighth Circuit did not suppress the evidence from the present wiretap because it found sufficient
showing of probable cause and necessity in the warrant. Id. See also United States v. Harvey, 560 F.
Supp. 1040, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (utilizing the "but for" approach in determining the applicability
of the suppression remedy to a violation of the previous applications requirement).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
151. See LEGIS. HIsT. supra note 31, at 2,192 (repeating the statutory language without addi-
tional discussion); see also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 255-56 (asserting that the statute is ambiguous
and case law is neither clear nor consistent); Note, Minimization of Wire Interceptions: Pre-Search
Guidelnes and Post-Search Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1411 n.4 (1975) (stating that the
factual basis for determining compliance " remains a legislative secret") [hereinafter cited as Note,
Pre-Search Guidelines]; Note, Minimization Requirement after United States v. Scott.: Myth or Real-
ity, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 601, 608 (arguing that uncertainty surrounds the minimization requirement
because neither the statute nor the legislative history provide courts with any guidelines to determine
compliance) [herinafter cited as Note, Minimization Requirement.]
152. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
153. Id. at 137. The Court stated that courts should review the actions of government agents "in
light of the facts and circumstances then known to [them]." Id. The defendants contended that
because Title III requires good faith efforts to minimize, a lack of good faith minimization efforts
constitutes a Title III violation. The Court rejected this argument and held that the statute ad-
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tive intent.154 The Court asserted that relevant factors in this determina-
tion include the nature and extent of suspected criminal activity, 55 the
normal use of the monitored telephone, 156 the length and nature of the
conversation, 157 the procedures the government used to limit intercep-
tions,15 and the degree of judicial supervision. 59
The Supreme Court has never addressed the appropriate remedy for
violations of the minimization requirement.' 60  Lower courts have uti-
dresses the conduct, not the motivation, of executing officers. The Court further suggested that the
legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend § 2515 to go beyond general search and
seizure law. Id. at 138-39 (quoting LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 31, at 2185).
154. The Court was careful to reserve motive as one factor in determining whether suppression
is appropriate after a court has found a violation. Id. at 139. Because the Court found that govern-
ment agents in Scott satisfied the minimization requirement, however, it did not address the appro-
priate remedy for a violation. Id. at 135-36 n.10.
155. Id. at 141. The Court contended that the scope of permissable surveillance is greater in
investigations of suspected crimes involving widespread conspiracies than in suspected crimes in-
volving conspiracies limited to certain, identified persons. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 599
F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
156. 436 U.S. at 141. Courts addressing the adequacy of minimization efforts have distinguished
between wiretapping of public and private telephones. These courts generally hold that government
agents must make more diligent efforts to minimize when tapping public telephones. See, e.g, United
States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid without opinion, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 259 (D. Kan. 1975).
157. 436 U.S. at 141-42. If the conversation is short, the parties use a code, or the agent does not
know one party to the conversation, the agent may have a difficult time ascertaining whether the call
is pertinent. See, e.g., United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1976) (law enforcement
officials had difficulty identifying speakers because the calls often mixed business with pleasure);
United States v. Cale, 508 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (because the parties to the conversation
spoke in Croatian, government officials intercepted all calls until they located a translator); United
States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (officials had difficulty distinguishing relevant
conversations from innocent conversations because the calls were often short and ambiguous, and
the subject matter of the conversations changed quickly), affld without opinion, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (conversants used coded and
foreign language).
158. See, eg., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 312 (2d Cir. 1983) (minimization require-
ment met because the agents took reasonable steps to limit interceptions); United States v. DePalma,
461 F. Supp. 800, 817-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (each agent read and initialed written procedures that
limited surveillance to a specified period of time).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980); United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Clemente, 482 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980).
For a thorough discussion of compliance with the minimization requirement, see Note, Post-
Search Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps Minimization, Amendment. Sealing and hIven.
tories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92 (1975); Note, Pre-Search Guidelines, supra note 151; Note, Minimi.
zation Requirement, supra note 151.
160. The Court in Scott found that the government had complied with the minimization require-
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lized three separate strategies in assessing violations of the require-
ment.' 6' The first strategy calls for the suppression of all conversations
seized under the interception order.' 62  The second strategy demands
suppression only of improperly seized interceptions. 63 The final strategy
determines the extent of suppression based on the level of good faith
demonstrated by the law enforcement officers executing the surveillance
warrant. 1
64
The first strategy presumes that total suppression deters law enforce-
ment officers from intercepting nonpertinent calls. 165  Courts employing
the first strategy contend that the sanction of partial suppression does not
afford the public the full deterrent protection of the minimization re-
quirement.' 66 These courts maintain that partial suppression encourages
ment and thus did not address the appropriate remedy for a violation of the requirement. 436 U.S.
at 136 n.10.
161. See Note, Pre-Search Guidelines, supra note 151 at 1435 n. 116 (noting the three approaches
to the suppression problem); see also United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1139-45 (2d Cir.
1976) (discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each strategy).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046-47 (D. Md.), afl'd on other
grounds, (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds. 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Leta, 332 F.
Supp. 1357, 1360 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 246-49 (D.D.C.
1971); see also United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. Shakur, 560 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp.
345, 394-95 (N.D. Ill.), afl'd, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735,
745-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States
v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
163. See United States v. Prinicipie, 531 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1976) (suppression limited to tele-
phone calls that the government intercepted in violation of a specific order).
164. See United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd
without opinion, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Webster, 473 F. Supp. 586 (D. Md.
1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981); see also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 266 (arguing that partial
suppression is appropriate when government agents acted in good faith).
165. E.g., United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.) (contending that suppres-
sion of only "innocent" calls would encourage government officials to intercept all calls), aff'd on
other grounds, (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); see also United States v.
Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 246-49 (D.D.C. 1971) (noting that government interception of obviously
personal calls constituted blatant disregard for the requirement).
166. United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1044 (D. Md.) (quoting United States v. Scott,
331 F. Supp. 233, 248 (D.D.C. 1971)) (contending that indiscriminate government interception of
private conversations would render the minimization requirement illusory), aff'd on other grounds,
(4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233,
248 (D.D.C. 1971) (permitting government agents to intercept conversations that are clearly not
pertinent to the investigation would reduce the minimization requirement to "meaningless
verbiage").
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law enforcement officials to listen to all conversations, knowing that the
only conversations subject to suppression at trial are those not pertinent
to the investigation. 167 Courts applying the total suppression sanction
further suggest that because a "seized" conversation can never be re-
turned, the minimization must take place by the agent during the surveil-
lance and not by the courts after the surveillance. 168
The partial suppression approach emphasizes the legality of the inter-
ception order. Courts applying this approach maintain that evidence
seized under a lawful order should not be suppressed simply because
agents seized other items outside the scope of the order.' 69 The partial
suppression view invokes language in the legislative history that suggests
that Congress did not intend the Title III exclusionary remedy 70 to be
more expansive than that in general search and seizure law. 171 Depend-
167. United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.) (contending that partial sup-
pression would benefit overzealous agents), aff'd on other grounds, (4th Cir. 1972), rep'd on other
grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
168. Id. (observing that a "conversation once seized can never truly be given back as can a
physical object"). The court in Focarile also compared "seized" conversations with normal seizures
and stated:
The right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment has been more invaded where a
conversation which can never be returned has been seized than where a physical object
which can be returned has been seized. There is more reason, therefore, to require a more
strict rule than the partial suppression remedy ....
Id. See also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 267 (advocating the use of total suppression when eavesdrop-
ping takes on the character of a general search).
169. See United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.) (courts should not suppress intercep-
tions within the scope of the order because agents intercepted conversations outside the order), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972) (courts
should not suppress all wiretapping evidence solely because agents gathered extraneous evidence),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Shakur, 560 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (assert-
ing that although officers wrongfully intercepted privileged calls, suppression was appropriate only
for the wrongfully intercepted calls); United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (con-
tending that courts should not suppress validly intercepted calls because government agents failed to
satisfy the minimization requirement with respect to other calls), afl'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert,
denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982).
171. See United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that the legisla-
tive history does not reveal any attempt to go beyond general search and seizure law); see also LEcIS,
HisT., supra note 31, at 2190 (indicating that Congress did not intend § 2515 to "press the scope of
the suppression role beyond general search and seizure law").
For authority concluding that courts should suppress only those items wrongfully seized, see
Thweatt v. United States, 433 F.2d 1226, 1232 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting that courts should
suppress illegally seized evidence and permit introduction of all other evidence at trial); United
States v. Langford, 303 F. Supp. 1387, 1388-89 (D. Minn. 1969). In Langford, authorities conducted
a search in areas not specified in the search warrant. The reviewing court refused to suppress evi-
dence lawfully seized under the search warrant, concluding that the good faith actions of the officers
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ing on the circumstances, this approach may deter violations of the mini-
mization requirement."v2 Courts endorsing the partial suppression
approach observe that Title III provides civil remedies17 3 for those per-
sons who suffer an invasion of their privacy.17
4
The third approach links the scope of suppression with the minimiza-
tion attempt. 175 If agents show a high regard for privacy and make a
good faith effort to comply with the minimization requirement, courts
adhering to this approach will employ the partial suppression sanc-
tion.176 When, in contrast, agents show a blatant disregard for the mini-
mization requirement, total suppression may be appropriate.'7 This
flexible approach encourages the government to comply with the minimi-
zation requirement but does not penalize it for its good faith, yet not
wholly successful, efforts.1
7 8
did not warrant suppression of all the evidence. Although Langford seems to support the third
response to minimization violations, see infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text, courts and com-
mentators have cited the case in support of the partial suppression approach. See United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 194 (W.D. Pa. 1971), amended, 340 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
aff7d, 530 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1976); Note, Pre-Search Guidelines, supra note 151, at 1435 n.l 16.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1976) (court sup-
pressed only those conversations intercepted in violation of a court order prohibiting the interception
of calls after 7:30 p.m.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); see also United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.
Supp. 345, 389-98 (N.D. I1l.) (court contended that it should suppress conversations that began
innocently), appeal dismissed, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982).
174. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1972) (suggesting that courts
should suppress only nonpertinent calls and permit lawsuits by aggrieved persons), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (better approach is to
give notice to persons who were subject to unlawful surveillance so they can sue).
175 United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905
(1977); Note, Pre-Search Guidelines, supra note 151, at 1436 n.l 16.
176. See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158 (9th Cir. 1975) (suppression is inappropriate
when agents employ good faith minimization efforts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United
States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (courts should admit surveillance evidence
only if agents exhibit a high regard for privacy), aft'd, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980).
177. See United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979) (suppression inappropriate
when the court found that government officials satisfied the minimization requirement and were not
demonstrably disrespectful of privacy), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Hyde, 574
F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978) (blatant disregard for minimization requirement may justify suppression);
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.) (suppression inappropriate when the government
proved that its conduct avoided unnecessary intrusion and did not flagrantly violate the minimiza-
tion requirement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Webster, 473 F. Supp. 586 (D.
Md. 1979) (suggesting that courts should suppress only improperly intercepted calls in the absence
of bad faith on the government's part), aff'd, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified, 669 F.2d 185
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
178. See Note, Pre-Search Guidelines, supra note 151, at 1436 n.116.
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The "but for" test'79 is inapplicable to violations of the postauthoriza-
tion minimization requirement.1 80 Application of the Chun analyses' 8'
to these cases reveals that the minimization requirement is a central safe-
guard in Title III under all three strategies. This conclusion is apparent
because all three approaches require some suppression for a violation. 18 2
Disagreement over the extent of suppression arises from differing opin-
ions as to whether selective suppression satisfies the purpose of the mini-
mization requirement. Courts adhering to the first approach emphasize
that improperly "seized" conversations can never be returned and urge
that improper interception of conversations does not serve the purpose of
the minimization requirement.18 3  Courts employing the second ap-
proach, however, reason that the purpose of the minimization require-
ment is served as long as the government does not use improperly seized
conversations at trial.'84 The third approach also gives implicit consider-
ation to the third inquiry of the Chun test, questioning whether the gov-
ernment deliberately violated the requirement.1 85 Where the court finds
a deliberate violation it will suppress all evidence of wiretapping.' 86
F. The Sealing Requirement
When an intercept order expires, law enforcement officials must imme-
diately present the tape recordings to the judge and seal the tapes accord-
ing to the judge's instructions. 187  The government may introduce the
recordings at trial if the seal is absent or if there was a delay in the sealing
process as long as it provides a satisfactory explanation for the absence or
delay. 188
179. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
180. The Supreme Court may, however, expand the scope of the "but for" test to cover inten-
tional violations of Title III procedures. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. In light of the purposes of Title III to
protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, see supra text accompanying note 30, it would
be difficult not to consider the minimization requirement central to Title III's statutory scheme.
183. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 169-74 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1982).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (unexplained four-day delay in sealing constitutes grounds for suppression); United States v.
McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1980) (delay in sealing requires an explanation); United States v.
Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v.
Diadone, 558 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1977) (considering whether delay required suppression); United
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Courts have adopted several approaches and have reached different
results in determining whether a violation of the sealing requirement
compels suppression."19 This disparity stems from the courts' tendency
to use the same factors to decide whether a violation of the sealing re-
quirement has occurred and whether a violation requires suppression. 190
The Chun test,' 9' on the other hand, provides a useful framework for
analyzing these different approaches. 92
The Chun test initially calls for a determination of whether the sealing
procedure serves a central function in Title II. 193 Courts generally have
agreed that the purpose of the sealing requirement is to protect the integ-
States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975) (considering whether a fifty-seven day delay in seal-
ing intercepted tapes required suppression); United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976)
(rejecting the government's argument that suppression is necessary only when the seal is absent and
holding that "a seal provided by this subsection" requires an "immediate" sealing).
Courts will excuse a delay in sealing if the issuing judge is unavailable when the government
terminates the interception. See United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977) (delay excused
because judge was on vacation); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1972) (same), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1973); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (delay excused
when judge was unavailable). Courts will also excuse a delay resulting from the government's per-
formance of necessary administrative tasks, such as duplication of tapes. See United States v. Mc-
Grath, 622 F.2d 36, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1980) (delay excused because the tapes were transported to one
city for duplication and to another city for sealing); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d
Cir.) (delay excused when government officials duplicated, labeled, and checked two hundred reels of
tape), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 981 (1979); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840-41 (5th Cir.)
(six-day delay acceptable because of the need to check and inventory tapes), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
874 (1975); see also J. CARR, supra note 5, at 392.
189. See Note, Use of Surveillance Evidence Under Title If." Bridging the Legislative Gap Be-
tween the Language and the Purpose of the Sealing Requirement, 36 VAND. L. REV. 325 (1983)
(discussing the various approaches in dealing with violations of the sealing requirement).
190. For example, the courts have considered official tampering or lack of tampering with tapes
to be an important factor in determining whether a violation of the sealing requirement exists and
whether a violation compels suppression. See, eg., United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (lack of tampering is an important component of a satisfactory explanation for not meet-
ing the sealing requirement); United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977) (suppression
was inappropriate where government officials did not tamper with the tapes), cert denied, 435 U.S.
923 (1978); McMillan v. United States, 558 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977) (court did not suppress for a
technical violation in the absence of any allegation of tampering); United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d
775 (5th Cir. 1977) the government did not tamper with the tapes and thus did not violate the
sealing requirement); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 1974) (court did not
suppress for a violation of the sealing requirement because it found that the tapes were untampered),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
191. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
192. The "but-for" test does not by its terms apply to the postauthorization requirement. See
supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. If the Supreme Court adds a deliberate violation as a
grounds for suppression, see supra note 83, then suppression would be possible in a sealing case.
193. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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rity of the recordings 94 and thus ensure their admissibility at trial. 95
For example, the Second and Seventh Circuits have explicitly held that
the integrity function of the sealing requirement is central to Title III's
statutory scheme. 196
Courts addressing the suppression problem have focused primarily on
the second prong of the Chun test, 9 7 which requires an inquiry into
whether executing officers have served the purpose of the requirement
despite "irregularities" 198 in the sealing process. Courts have not acted
uniformly in deciding when irregularities in the sealing process subvert
the integrity of the recordings and thus defeat the purpose of the sealing
requirement. 199
The Third and Eighth Circuits contend that suppression is inappropri-
ate absent an allegation or finding of tampering. 2" Under this approach,
the integrity of the recordings is maintained and the purpose of the seal-
ing requirement is satisfied absent proof of alteration. The Second Cir-
cuit, in contrast, maintains that the purpose of the sealing requirement is
194. See LEGiS. Hisr., supra note 31, at 2,193 (stating that the requirement "safeguard[s] the
identity, physical integrity and contents of the recordings to assure their admissibility into evi-
dence"). The sealing procedures should preclude the possibility of tampering with or altering tape
recordings. See Note, supra note 189, at 331; see also United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th
Cir. 1977) (contending that the purpose of the sealing requirement is to preserve the integrity of
tapes and prevent tampering); McMillan v. United States, 558 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977) (same);
United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (asserting that the purpose of the sealing
requirement is to safeguard the confidentiality of tapes and to protect the tapes from editing).
195. See LEGIs. HIST., supra note 31, at 2,193 (stating that the sealing requirement helps to
ensure the admissibility for recordings at trial); see, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d
Cir. 1974) (contending that the sealing requirement protects the integrity of tapes after interception
for evidentiary purposes).
196. See United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1975) ("post-interception integrity
measures are. . . important"); United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976) (contend-
ing that the sealing requirement is an integral part of the statutory scheme of judicial supervision),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
197. See, eg., United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1312 (4th Cir. 1979) (court used the Chun
analysis but never addressed whether the requirement is a central safeguard), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1102 (1980).
198. The term "irregularity" is more appropriate than "violation" due to the split in the courts
over whether lack of tampering is relevant to the government's explanation or only to the question of
suppression once the court has found a violation of a sealing requirement. See supra note 189.
199. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text; and accompanying text; supra notes 190-92
and accompanying text.
200. See United States v. McMillan, 558 F.2d 877, 879 (8th Cir. 1977) (government agents com-
mitted a "technical" violation but nevertheless satisfied the purpose of the sealing requirement be-
cause no allegation of tampering made); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 1974)
(because the trial court found that government agents did not alter the tapes, suppression was not
appropriate), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
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not met and suppression is warranted if the government cannot proffer a
satisfactory explanation for an irregularity in the sealing porocess.20 '
Other courts have adopted a more flexible stance and have chosen to
examine the particular facts in each case to determine whether irregulari-
ties in the sealing process warrant suppression. 22
Some courts have held that no violation has occurred if the require-
ment's purpose has been served.2"3 Other courts have held that if the
purpose of the requirement has been served, suppression is inappropriate
despite a violation.2" These two variations are functionally similar in
that suppression under each rests on a judicial finding that executing of-
ficers have not maintained the sealing requirement's integrity function.20 5
In making this determination, courts have considered the length of the
delay, 20 6 the reasons for the delay,207 the location of the tapes while not
sealed,20 8 any precautionary measures the government might have
taken, 2°9 and the presence or absence of allegations by the defendants
that the government altered the tapes.210
201. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978). The Second Circuit based its holding on the observation that government officials may easily
alter tape recordings and that the sealing process provides an external safeguard against such tam-
pering. Id. at 505. The Gigante court asserted that a requirement that the defendant prove tamper-
ing "would vitiate the congressional purpose of the sealing process." Id.
202. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
203. See, eg., United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (lack of tampering
is an important component of satisfactory explanation); United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314
(4th Cir. 1979) (same); see also United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (in deter-
mining the adequacy of the government's explanation, courts should examine whether government
officials kept the tapes in a place assuring reliability).
204. See, eg., United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1975) (court did not accept
the government's explanation but did not find a violation of the sealing requirement because the
defendants did not allege prejudice).
205. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
206. See United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (a four-day delay did not
violate the statute); United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1975) (a fifty-seven day
delay was acceptable only because the defendants failed to allege prejudice).
207. See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314 (4th Cir. 1979) (government failed to seal
the original tapes because duplicate tapes were malfunctioning), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980);
United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977) (agent listened to the original tapes because
the secretary could not accurately transcribe a section of the tapes), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978).
208. See United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (tapes kept in police vault);
United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469,471 (7th Cir. 1977) (tapes kept in secure place), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 923 (1978).
209. See United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1977) (only one agent had access
to the tapes), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
210. See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendants did not allege
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The last inquiry under the Chun test requires a determination of
whether the government deliberately ignored the sealing requirement to
its tactical advantage. 211 At least one court has supported a decision not
to suppress for a sealing irregularity by stating that the defendants did
not allege that a delay in the sealing of the tapes was attributable to the
government's bad faith efforts to gain a tactical advantage.
2 1 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the plain language of the suppression sanctions in Title III,213
the Supreme Court has held that not every violation of Title III's proce-
dural safeguards mandates the suppression of evidence from electronic
surveillance.2" 4 Two possible approaches are available to courts in deter-
mining which violations of Title III require suppression. The first ap-
proach is the Chun test.21 5 The second approach is the "but for" test.
2 16
Application of these tests to various Title III violations has revealed that
the two tests may lead to contrary results.
The Chun test focuses attention on the "substantive role ' 21 7 of the
requirement in Title III's proscriptions against unwarranted use of elec-
tronic surveillance. A "but for" analysis, on the other hand, examines
the role of the requirement in the judicial authorization of the wiretap,
not in the overall framework of the statute.21 8 This latter approach is
narrower in scope and does not address the sanction of suppression for
postauthorization violations. If the Supreme Court were to hold that
suppression is an appropriate sanction for deliberate violations of the
statute, then its "but for" analysis could justify suppression for a viola-
that government officials tampered'with the tapes), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980); United States
v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977) (court will not find a violation of the sealing requirement
when there is no allegation of tampering in an otherwise close case); see supra notes 190-91 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra text accompanying note 76.
212. See United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1279 (2d Cir.) (court noted that there was no
attempt by the government to gain a tactical advantage), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
213. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)(i)-(iii) (1982); see supra notes 8 & 54 and accompanying
text.
214. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); see supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
215. See United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974); supra notes 71-76 and accompany-
ing text.
216. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
217. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 435 (1977); see supra notes 71-76 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Chun test).
218. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing "but for" test).
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tion of any Title III procedure.219
The question whether the government has violated a Title III provi-
sion often is inextricably intertwined with the question whether suppres-
sion is an appropriate sanction for the violation. Courts rarely announce
their methods of analyzing the appropriateness of suppression in a partic-
ular case. A review of recent case law, however, reveals some general
patterns. The First,220 Sixth,22' and Eleventh Circuits222 have apparently
adopted the Donovan "but for" approach. The District of Columbia,
223
Third,224 Fourth,225 Fifth,226 and Ninth Circuits227 have employed the
Chun approach, except when faced with violations of the identification
and notice requirements. No clear approach to the suppression question
is apparent from decisions of the Second,228 Seventh,229 and Eighth
Circuits.230
A single approach to the applicability of the suppression remedy to
219. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
220. See United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1977).
221. See United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980); United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 855 (1977).
222. See United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
223. See United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Johnson,
696 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
224. See United States v. Martorella, 455 F. Supp. 459 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
225. See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102
(1980); United States v. Clerkly, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1980);
United States v. Webster, 473 F. Supp. 586 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
226. See United States v. Caggiano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mendoza,
574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); cf. United States v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1977)
(following Donovan "but for" analysis on narrow issue of suppression for violation of notice
requirement).
227. See United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Martin, 599
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Spagnulo, 549 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1977).
228. Compare United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1983) (Chun approach) and United
States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977) (Chun approach) with United States v. McGrath, 622
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980) ("but for" test).
229. Compare United States v. Angelina, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977) (Chun test), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 923 (1978) with United States v. Williams, 565 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("but for" test)
and United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill.) ("but for" test), appeal dismissed, 690
F 2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982).
230. See United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1977) (employing a combination of
Chun and "but for" tests). Compare United States v. Constanza, 549 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1977)
(Chun approach) with United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1978) ("but for" test);
United States v. Barletta, 565 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1977) ("but for" test); United States v. Abrahmson,
553 F2d 1164 (8th Cir.) ("but for" test), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) and United States v.
DiGirlomo, 550 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1977) ("but for" test).
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Title III violations would promote the interest of uniformity.23' Con-
gress enacted Title III in an effort to balance the privacy interests of
citizens with law enforcement's need for effective investigative tech-
232niques. 2 The test that would effectuate these twin goals must deter
government officials from unnecessarily invading individual privacy and
yet not result in the automatic suppression of relevant and trustworthy
evidence derived from minor violations of the statute.
Neither the "but for" nor the Chun test results in the suppression of
evidence for minor violations of the statute. The two tests diverge in
their protection of privacy rights. The "but for" test creates an artificial
distinction between pre and postauthorization violations, thereby offering
little or no protection to the privacy rights of citizens after a judge has
issued a surveillance warrant. The Chun test, in contrast, applies to all
violations of Title III and therefore protects privacy throughout the pe-
riod of surveillance. In the absence of empirical studies measuring the
effectiveness of the two approaches, the Chun test appears best suited to
effectuate Congress' goals in enacting Title III.
Pamela Schmidt Greer
231. See supra note 34 (stating that a congressional purpose in enacting Title III was to delineate
a uniform basis for official use of electronic surveillance).
232. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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